Now the
President of the United States says that Sony “made a mistake” by pulling the
film. But Sony Pictures Entertainment
CEO Michael Lynton says the film decision was a postponement rather than a
cancellation. On Sunday representatives
for Sony reinforced this point, assuring that the movie would be seen without
suggesting how or when. This points to
the primary crisis communication leadership problem here. While this crisis has
begun to stretch its tentacles well beyond Sony, it began with Sony. And Sony has made its crisis worse through
its uneven and sometimes cavalier response.
When
embarrassing emails were leaked, how many of us thought “Gee, I wonder what
I’ve written in thoughtless haste that would embarrass me”? There was some sympathy for Sony. But then the company brought lawyers in to
serve notice to media including the New
York Times and Wall Street Journal
that they’d pay a price for distributing any material they obtained through the
cyberattack. This served only to highlight the content of the emails and even smacked
of desperation. And apart from some
half-hearted apologies from executives, including Sony Pictures co-chair Amy
Pascal, there’s been precious little from Sony suggesting that they believe
they have contributed in any way to the crisis.
Crisis
leadership is lacking. Yes, they were
hacked. Yes the hacking was of mammoth
proportions. But then questions were
asked about how the company’s security tools could have allowed this to happen. In response Sony said, essentially, that any
organization with the best cybersecurity would not have withstood this
hacking. Lawsuits are now following,
filed by employees who blame the company for release of their personal
data. Citing existing policies and
promising a review and remedy would have been useful in garnering more public support. More public mea culpas from the executive
suite would have also been appropriate. Lynton
shifted blame to distributors regarding the cancellation or postponement of the
film’s release. There are many ways to
distribute the film. At last those
options are being acknowledged. Lynton
says they’re exploring possibilities, but that his company is not in the
distribution business. It has been a chaotic response, lacking much semblance
of a solid strategy.
Crisis
communication scholarship, including my own, suggests a different way. How the public perceives the cause of a
crisis has a great deal to do with how responsibility is attributed. When Sony was the victim, responsibility for
the crisis fell elsewhere. Now Sony has
allowed at least some perception of responsibility to drift back to the
corporation. It has attacked or
dismissed key publics and has paid the price.
Simply put, Sony is more likely to succeed if it cultivates rather than
alienates relationships with key publics.
Pre-existing relationships matter in crisis communication, but so does
the tending of those relationships in the midst of a crisis.
Most would
agree that this is perhaps an unprecedented cyberattack that has now been
linked to North Korea, according to the FBI.
And as with any organization-threatening crisis the ground has been
shifting under Sony Pictures executives mercilessly. New facts emerge daily requiring strategic
adjustment. That’s precisely why it’s
time to stop finger-pointing at the media, at North Korea, at theater
owners. Sony Pictures needs to take hold
of the situation, take responsibility where appropriate, clearly lay out a way
forward for “The Interview,” announce internal reviews and repercussions, and
review security tools and policies.
That’s the leadership that’s needed in this crisis. So far, it’s been missing.
A version of the post was published on the Grady College website on December 27, 2014
